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that will promote economic efficiency and
welfare. As Krauss emphasizes, trade protection is certainly not the way to go.
Krauss is hypercritical of the programs of
foreign economic and military aid that the
United States has provided to Western
Europe (and Japan?), to the less developed
countries, and more recently to countries
making the transition from central planning
to a market-based economy. He argues that
all these programs have inevitably failed
either because they were misguided in pursuit of egalitarianism or condoned ineffective
policies in the recipient countries. In his
view, a great deal of money could have been
saved if the United States had been much less
generous and insisted on market-based incentives, restructuring, and de-emphasis of government-supported programs. In retrospect,
many of Krauss' criticisms are well taken, although at times he rails too much against the
ideas of historical men of influence and fails
to take into account the complex tides of history and the politics of times past.
In his concluding chapter, Krauss addresses issues of regionalism, focusing on the
European Union and NAFTA. He criticizes
the pursuit of economic and monetary integration in Europe on the grounds that it
serves to reinforce the centralized influence
and power of the European Commission
and that insufficient encouragement is being
given to increasing imports from Eastern
Europe. He thus downplays here again the
role of history and especially the political dynamics that underlie the desire of the Europeans to achieve greater harmony in their relationships so as to overshadow the deep
conflicts of the past. In contrast, his view of
NAFTA seems more benign. He argues that
it will bring about wage convergence so as to
resolve the problems of U.S.-Mexican migration, and that the extension of NAFTA to the
rest of the Western Hemisphere will be a
stepping stone toward global free trade. Here
I found it curious that he did not discuss the
role that the WTO might play in fostering
multilateral trade liberalization rather than
taking this detour through regional trading
blocs.
ROBERT M. STERN

Universityof Michigan,AnnArbor

The post-cold war trading system: Who's on
first? By SYLVIAOSTRY. Londonand Chicago:
Universityof ChicagoPress, 1997. 330 pages.
$45.00. ISBN 0-226-63789-1.
Sylvia Ostry does not directly answer the
question in the title until the final page. But
the answer is never in doubt: the dominance
of the United States emerges starkly in this
insightful and engrossing chronicle of postwar international trade negotiations. Ostry's
lively historical account reveals how American interests and beliefs have shaped virtually
all aspects of the postwar trading system,
from the creation of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to the completion of the Uruguay Round. As the
former head of the Canadian delegation
at the Uruguay Round, she displays a commanding knowledge of trade policy developments and presents a concise, balanced, and
incisive bird's eye view of the forces at work.
Ostry shows how American reluctance to
cede any sovereignty to international organizations-so evident today-led to the failure
to implement the International Trade Organization, which was to have been a much more
powerful and encompassing organization than
the GATT. Numerous exceptions and escape
clauses were built into the GATT to make it
acceptable. Nonetheless, American-led trade
liberalization under the auspices of the GATT
provided a huge boost to Europe and Japan.
But the limited powers of the GATT set the
stage for subsequent problems. At first,
United States dominance of the world economy allowed it to accept lack of reciprocity by
other countries in liberalizing trade. But by
the 1970s, the tremendous growth of Japan,
seemingly abetted by industrial policy, along
with stagflation at home, spawned American
complaints about the GATT'stoothlessness in
the face of other countries' "unfair"practices.
The United States responded with both
unilateral and multilateral initiatives. The
former manifested itself as the "New Protectionism," consisting mainly of voluntary export restraints on Japanese imports, while
the latter was reflected in the agenda of
the Tokyo Round of trade negotiationsnon-tariff barriers, the European Common
AgriculturalPolicy,governmentprocurement.
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The Tokyo Round achieved little, however,
and U.S. frustration escalated in the 1980s.
Although stagflation eased, the ballooning
U.S. trade deficits provided macroeconomic
fuel for the microeconomic complaints about
predatory Japanese behavior. Pressure for
stronger unilateral actions culminated in the
enactment of the infamous Super 301 provision of U.S. trade law, which authorized retaliation against countries for a wide range of
"unfair" trade practices. While Ostry condemns Super 301 as a dangerous threat to a
rules-based system, she points out that its effects were limited due to the executive
branch's reluctance. The threat of stronger
U.S. measures may have helped persuade
other countries to accede to U.S. pressure for
a new and more ambitious round of trade negotiations, the Uruguay Round.
Unlike the Tokyo Round, Ostry views the
Uruguay Round as a major achievement, notably the agreements on services and intellectual property rights, and the creation of the
World Trade Organization (WTO). In responding to American concerns and tackling
some of the thorny issues raised by "deeper
integration," the Uruguay Round revived
multilateralism and diminished the appeal of
regional trade agreements, which Ostry dismisses as a "fad"that has "gotten out of hand"
(pp. 203-04). The WTO considerably enhances the weak dispute settlement powers of
the GATT. The familiar American ambivalence towards international organizations
nearly blocked ratification of the Uruguay
Round, and in 1995 U.S. threats of punitive
tariffs on Japanese luxury car imports in response to alleged lack of access to the Japanese car market posed a potentially fatal
threat to the WTO. Ostry argues that the
world trading system must make continued
albeit incremental progress on issues such as
foreign investment, competition policy, and
regulatory reform to create a global "level
playing field," while navigating the shoals of
"system frictions" related to differences in
economic structures and cultures.
The analysis of the world economy is not as
convincing as the discussion of trade policy.
For example, Ostry stresses the "enormous"
American investment in Europe beginning in
the 1950s (p. 29), but Table 2.3 reports only

nominal investment flows, providinglittle idea
of how rapidly such flows increased in real
terms or how large they loomed relative to
European capital stocks. Many tables and figures are dated and only loosely related to the
thread of the argument.The view that China's
economic emergence is "the most formidable
challenge the Western powers have ever
faced" (p. 211) is surely an exaggeration.
Did America undermine its own dominance by promoting European and Japanese
reconstruction through unilateral trade liberalization and technology transfer? Ostry
equivocates. She seems to concur with arguments that early American nurturing of the
Japanese economy was a "disaster" (p. 48),
because it did not require reciprocal Japanese
liberalization. She approvingly quotes Raymond Aron's statement "As the predominant
economy, America had the advantage from its
trading partners' point of view of believing in
freedom and communication rather than in
secrecy and bureaucracy"(p. 26). When discussing the 1990s, however, Ostry accepts the
current conventional wisdom that Japan and
Europe are at a disadvantage relative to the
more free-wheeling and flexible American
system. Her enthusiasm for "deeper integration" may also be overdone. After all, comparative advantage is based on economic diversity. Moreover, regulatory harmonization
may often be unnecessary to provide foreign
and domestic firms with equal market access-the traditional GATT principle of national treatment is sufficient. Despite these
questions, Ostry has provided a sophisticated
and illuminating look at the paradoxes of
American trade policies and their global consequences.
STEPHEN-S. GOLUB

SwarthmoreCollege
G Financial Economics
The economics offinancial markets. By HENDRIK
S. HOUTHAKKERAND PETER J. WILLIAMSON.

New York and Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1996. Pp. xiii, 361. $39.95. ISBN 0-19504407-X.
JEL 97-0127
The Economics of Financial Markets is an
outstanding book about financial markets.
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